Greenland’s journalistic media are few and small, while social media are important, writes Signe Ravn-Højgaard, director of the Digital Infrastructure Think Tank, which co-published a report on the topic.
We are in an era where the tectonic plates of our international community are shifting. That is felt in Greenland. US President Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland, and Greenlanders’ increasing frustration with the Denmark–Greenland relationship, have put Greenland at the centre of significant international attention. Increased interest also brings a heightened risk of foreign disinformation. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) have assessed that foreign influence attempts were “likely” leading up to Greenland’s parliamentary elections on 11 March 2025.
Recent Findings and Examples of Disinformation
In December 2024, the Digital Infrastructure Thank Tank, together with the University of Greenland, Common Consultancy, and Analyse & Tal, published a study on foreign disinformation on Facebook in Greenland. We concluded that there were no signs of foreign disinformation or influence campaigns at the time.
Today, a similar study would likely come to different conclusions. Already in January – just one month after our report’s release – we observed examples of false content on social media, including a fake profile impersonating Greenlandic politician Muté B. Egede on X (formerly Twitter), and a fraudulent post attributed to Danish politician Karsten Hønge, disseminating what experts described as pro-Russian messaging.
Already in January – just one month after our report’s release – we observed examples of false content on social media, including a fake profile impersonating Greenlandic politician Muté B. Egede on X.
Our December report highlighted that the debate surrounding Greenland–Denmark relations is particularly prominent on Facebook, stirring strong emotions and polarised opinions. Existing research into dissemination of disinformation in other contexts suggests these emotionally charged debates are fertile grounds for disinformation. Around topics where strong emotions are involved, the anger and frustration that already exist can act like a fire that is already burning, onto which influence campaigns can simply pour more gasoline. It is considerably more challenging to achieve similar effects through campaigns focused on less emotionally charged subjects.
Limited Media Capacity
However, Greenland’s vulnerability is not limited to emotionally charged debates. The nature of Greenland’s media and public sphere is also critical when considering the spread – and containment – of misinformation and disinformation:
During my tenure at the University of Greenland, my research included examining how media and public discourse in Greenland function differently compared with larger societies. Greenlandic media do not possess the resources available in larger societies, primarily because they are few in number and small in scale. Yet they face the same resource demands as larger markets when producing media products such as radio news, as, whether for 5.6 million or 56,000 people, the costs are almost the same.
Greenlandic media do not possess the resources available in larger societies, primarily because they are few in number and small in scale.
Approximately 30–40 people are engaged in news journalism in Greenland. These few journalists must cover numerous topics in various formats – and in both Greenlandic and Danish. As a result, they often struggle to provide in-depth coverage of any single subject and cannot dedicate significant time to individual stories.
Consequently, Greenlandic media face substantial limitations in fact-checking misinformation and disinformation and producing investigative journalism. Currently, the news department of Greenland’s public service broadcaster KNR is short ten employees, representing a third of their editorial positions. KNR is the only media outlet delivering television and radio news.
At the moment, Danish media produce considerable journalism about Greenland. Danish media contributed with fact-checking during election debates and aim to hold powerholders accountable and give voice to new sources – all crucial tasks during an election campaign. While this is beneficial, there are three key issues: Firstly, more journalism about Greenland is produced daily by Danish media for a Danish audience – also reaching Greenlandic citizens – than is produced by Greenlandic media specifically for Greenlandic audiences. This can skew the themes and perspectives reaching Greenlandic voters. Secondly, many Greenlanders lack trust in Danish media. Lastly, much of the Danish-produced journalism is consumed by very few people in Greenland. Content that does reach the Greenlandic population often does so virally through Facebook, potentially causing nuanced journalism to be overshadowed by a narrow set of topics circulated widely on social media.
Closely Connected Social Networks
Another finding from my research in media in small societies is the consequence of Greenland’s highly interconnected social networks, causing information on social media to spread rapidly among virtually everyone. Unlike Denmark, where distinct social groups of your life such as football friends, colleagues, and family in Jylland may have minimal overlap, Greenlandic social circles significantly overlap. A football friend might be related to your colleague and live next door to your brother. In Facebook terms, people commonly have many mutual friends.
Another finding from my research in media in small societies is the consequence of Greenland’s highly interconnected social networks, causing information on social media to spread rapidly among virtually everyone.
This interconnectedness means fewer social media shares are needed for content to reach a large segment of Greenland’s Facebook community. This effect becomes particularly evident during sudden events, such as a landslide blocking a major road in Nuuk, where information spreads via digital word-of-mouth faster than traditional media can report on it. Consequently, social media becomes a vital information source in Greenland. When multiple acquaintances share the same information, it can boost the content’s perceived credibility, even if it is misinformation. With social media as a dominant source of news and debate, there is a significant risk that false information could be accepted as truth, unchallenged by critical media.
Elections in such an environment in Greenland can potentially carry high stakes. Historically, many members of the Greenlandic parliament are elected with fewer than 100 votes, meaning even minor shifts can significantly influence election outcomes. Given the new geopolitical landscape, several actors could have vested interests in influencing the election’s results.
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